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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Moral theories tend to have slogans. Consequentialists maximise (or satisfice) the goodness 
of their actions’ consequences; deontologists respect certain rights and abide by certain 
duties; virtue ethicists cultivate flourishing characters. This book is about the slogan of a 
hitherto under-explored moral theory: care ethics. 
 Care ethics seeks to explain the imperative to enter into and maintain caring relations. 
This book aims to provide a new synthesis of the normative commitments that have emerged, 
over the last thirty years, as being central to care ethics. The goal is to use the tools of 
analytic philosophy to specify, unify, and justify these normative commitments, in a way that 
sheds new light on the theory.  
To that end, Part I the book surveys the vast literature that has arisen over the last 
thirty years within care ethics. It seeks to construct -- in a way that is clear and accessible to 
those unfamiliar with the theory -- the most plausible version of the key normative 
commitments that have emerged within that literature. Part I ultimately arrives at four key 
claims of care ethics, explaining how this version of care ethics arises out of critical reflection 
on the existing literature. These four claims, though, will be somewhat under-specified and 
only loosely connected. 
Part II seeks to give a justification of these four claims that will serve to both specify 
and unite the claims, thus removing their under-specified and loosely connected appearance. 
The aim is to bring these four claims under a single theoretical slogan. Although the slogan of 
care ethics remains elusive, most care ethicists agree that relationships -- between caregivers, 
care recipients, supporters of caregivers, and caregiving institutions -- lie somewhere near the 
normative heart of the theory. Part II makes this general claim more precise, arguing that care 
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ethics’ slogan is ‘dependency relationships generate responsibilities.’ I start Part II by 
presenting a new, detailed vision of precisely what dependency relationships consist in. I then 
use that conception of dependency relationships to unify, justify, and further specify the four 
claims developed in Part I. 
As well as providing a unified systematisation of care ethics, this book has another, 
subsidiary aim: to bring care ethics into the mainstream of analytic theory. Scholars have 
recently explored the similarities between care ethics and the mainstream theories of 
consequentialism (Driver 2005), Kantian deontology (Bramer 2010; S.C. Miller 2012), and, 
most often, virtue ethics (Halwani 2003; Slote 2007; though see Sander-Staudt 2006 and 
Noddings 2010, ch. 5 for rebuttals). Care ethics’ fraught relationship with liberal social 
contract theories has also been assessed (Kittay 1999; Silvers and Francis 2005; Stark 2007; 
Bhandary 2010). And scholars have explored the relation between care ethics and non-
mainstream moral theories, such as Confucian ethics (Li 1994; Luo 2007; though see Star 
2002; Yuan 2002; and Noddings 2010, ch. 5 for rebuttals) and African ethics (Harding 1987). 
At a more applied level, the care ethical approach has been used to great effect in analysing 
real-world ethical and political problems (Barnes 2012; Robinson 2011; Sevenhuijsen 1998; 
Tronto 2013).  
Despite this, we do not have a precise analysis of care ethics’ central normative 
commitment. Care ethics remains a somewhat shadowy entity at the outskirts of debates in 
analytic moral philosophy, often mentioned in connection to feminism and to virtue ethics, 
but without a definitive statement of precisely what its advocates are committed to -- without 
a slogan. (See, for example, chapter 12 of James Rachels’ (2003) widely-used textbook on 
moral philosophy, where care ethics is described as an ethics purely of the ‘home and hearth’ 
before being folded into virtue ethics.) My hope in writing this book is that we can bring care 
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ethics into the framework of mainstream analytic moral philosophy by crystallising its 
conceptual core, without simplifying (or worse, ignoring) its key feminist and 
phenomenological insights.  
Some readers -- some care ethicists -- will be wary of the task I have set myself. Care 
ethicists have tended to deride the idea that their theory might be explicable in terms of a 
precise, unitary, abstract slogan. Marian Barnes is correct when she says ‘[i]t is those 
philosophers who have responded to the real life and often messy moral dilemmas that people 
have struggled to make sense of in their everyday lives who have developed an ethic of care, 
not those who seek to determine moral principles through a process of logical 
argumentation.’ (Barnes 2012, 17–18) And Anca Gheaus is correct when she asserts that 
‘‘care,’ as it is employed in the feminist ethics of care literature, is better understood as a 
group of concepts with strong family resemblance but no essential trait in common.’ (Gheaus 
2009, 64; see similarly Bowden 1997, 2–6) Care ethicists seem to suspect something 
important would be lost in the assertion of a slogan, so do not even attempt to provide a clear 
statement of the normative core of the theory. (This is not to say theorists do not give clear 
definitions of ‘care’ itself. Those abound, as we shall see in Chapter 3. And a few have given 
general formulations of the imperative to care but, again as we shall see, this tends to be done 
in a derisory or not wholly general fashion -- see Chapter 2.) 
It is my contention that the gulf between Barnes’ two sets of philosophers is not so 
wide -- indeed, that almost all moral philosophers aim to respond to messy details and use 
logical argumentation to determine principles -- and that the insights of the former can be 
translated into the language of the latter. Contra Barnes, I believe that care ethics can be 
‘encompassed in abstractions’ (2012, 18) -- or at least, its core normative commitment can. 
And while I agree with Gheaus about how the notion of care has been employed in the 
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literature, contra Gheaus, I believe the group of care ethical concepts does have an essential 
trait in common. The aim of this book is to defend these beliefs. 
Why should we want to crystallise care ethics in this way? There are two main 
motivations. The first is that, unless care ethics has a core normative commitment, we might 
wonder whether it is a moral theory in any meaningful sense. As long as care ethics is simply 
a collection of statements that have been made by people who happen to call themselves ‘care 
ethicists,’ it will be unclear what is in the theory and what is out. There is no way to know if a 
new claim made by a self-proclaimed care ethicist is true to the theory’s guiding 
commitment, and no way to know whether existing claims should be rejected as not truly care 
ethical. The second motivation is more humble. This is that we should not simply assume 
care ethics lacks a slogan. We should at least hear out attempts to establish a unified, precise, 
explanatory statement of care ethics’ core slogan. This requires that someone attempts to 
establish the theory’s slogan. If my proposed slogan does not work, the ball is back in the 
court of the anti-unifiers.  
This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I give a broad 
overview of the range of claims typically associated with care ethics. This will serve to give 
the reader a ‘feel’ for the view that is to be unified, specified, and justified as the book 
proceeds. The following section makes some methodological remarks about the relationship 
between care ethics, ethical and political philosophy, feminism, and the history of 
philosophy. The chapter closes by giving an overview of the argument that is to come. 
 
1.1 Care Ethics: The General Picture 
Care ethicists start by taking the experience of decision-making as crucial data for ethical and 
political theorising. They point out that, when deliberating about what we morally ought to do 
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in some concrete scenario, we typically take account of the particularities and complexities of 
the relationships between the unique persons in the dilemma. We do not apply abstract rules 
or perform regimented calculi. These decision-making processes often strike us as coldly 
lacking in moral qualities or not quite suitable for the given situation. Rather, we consider 
concrete, particular others in complex webs of relationships. Because of their complexities, 
our relationships with particular others (and those particular others themselves) seem to be an 
irreducible part of moral justification and deliberation. Principles -- understood as 
conditionals (‘if X, then Y’ statements) with an imperative (‘do this’) consequent -- are at 
best insufficient, and at worst distortive, for proper moral justification and deliberation.  
 Famously within care ethics, this approach to moral deliberation is revealed by the 
data of psychologist Carol Gilligan (1982), who investigated the thought processes of women 
facing moral dilemmas. In contrast to findings about men in earlier studies (Kohlberg 1973), 
Gilligan found that many women did not appeal to general principles or make categorical 
assertions about right and wrong. They instead used ‘the responsibility conception,’ which 
‘focuses on the limitations of any particular resolution and describes the conflicts that 
remain.’ (Gilligan 1982, 22) This seeming lack of decisiveness was a result of women 
subjects’ perception that each dilemma involved many conflicting responsibilities. 
Paradigmatically, Gilligan described ‘Amy,’ a subject who saw a particular dilemma as ‘a 
narrative of relationships that extends over time’ in ‘a world that coheres through human 
connection rather than through systems of rules.’ (1982, 28–9) (The approach of using real 
people, facing real problems of care, is more recently deployed by Barnes (2006).) 
Through reflection on such thought processes, care ethicists are led to the following 
general claims: that responsibilities derive directly from relationships between particular 
people, rather than from abstract rules and principles; that deliberation should be empathy-
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based rather than duty- or principle-based; that personal relationships have a moral value that 
is often overlooked by other theories; that at least some responsibilities aim at fulfilling the 
particular needs of vulnerable persons (including their need for empowerment), rather than 
the universal rights of rational agents; and that morality demands not just one-off acts, but 
also certain ongoing patterns of interactions with others and certain general attitudes and 
dispositions. Most importantly, care ethicists claim that morality demands actions and 
attitudes of care, in addition to or even in priority to those of respect, non-interference, and 
tit-for-tat reciprocity (which care ethicists generally see as over-emphasised in other ethical 
and political theories). These views will be elaborated upon in Part I. 
Not all care ethicists hold all of these views, different theorists define them 
differently, and different theorists emphasise different ones. Nonetheless, this loose cluster of 
claims gives us some sense of what care ethicists believe matters morally. It is difficult to be 
more precise, as there is no generally agreed-upon statement of what care ethics is -- 
providing a much more precise statement is the aim of this book, and refining this 
preliminary cluster of claims is the aim of its early chapters. 
It is equally hard to specify exactly what care ethics is not. From early in its history, 
care ethics was contrasted to ‘traditional’ (e.g., utilitarian and Kantian) approaches to moral 
theorising. (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1980; Ruddick 1989) It is sometimes 
unclear exactly which other theories or theorists are being opposed here: the derogatory term 
‘traditional’ is attached by those writing on care ethics to the views that caring is not morally 
required (Engster 2005, 57), that morality is impartial through and through (Driver 2005, 183, 
though Driver defends consequentialism against this charge), that all moral demands are 
demands of justice (Held 2006, 17), that infants do not contribute to the moral value of 
parent-child relationships (Noddings 1999, 36), and that humans are autonomous and 
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independent  (S.C. Miller 2005, 140). Of course, many contemporary self-described 
utilitarians and Kantians would reject some or all of these claims. And almost all 
contemporary (and some early) care ethicists accept that care must be in some way fused or 
combined with its early opponent, justice, where ‘justice’ can be understood as primarily 
concerned with liberty and reciprocity (Clement 1996; Held 2004, 65, 68; Held 2006, 15–17; 
Pettersen 2008, ch. 6 (Pettersen also discusses Gilligan’s ambiguous attitude towards the 
care/justice distinction); Robinson 1999, 23ff; Ruddick 1998; Tronto 1987, 167). 
We should, I suggest, see care ethicists as attempting to point out certain important 
moral truths that tend to have been neglected by other theories. We should not see them as 
claiming that other theories get nothing right. It is consistent with care ethics to think that 
non-care ethical considerations are appropriate in some circumstances. It is also consistent 
with care ethics to think that some combination of care and non-care considerations is 
appropriate in all circumstances. This is important: as I read them, care ethicists do not take 
themselves to be giving an account of the whole of morality.
i
 Care ethicists rather take 
themselves to be pointing to an interrelated set of concerns that have hitherto been 
inadequately appreciated. The aim of this book is to clarify what makes those concerns 
interrelated -- what, that is to say, makes care ethics a theory, even if a theory of only part of 
the moral landscape. 
 
1.2 Care, Ethics, Politics, Feminism, and History 
In opening this chapter, I mentioned one political theory (liberalism) and five ethical theories 
(consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, Confucian ethics, African ethics). This might 
lead one to ask whether care ethics is a political or an ethical theory. The distinction between 
ethical and political theory is generally thought to lie in their guiding questions. Ethical 
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theories answer the question ‘what is the right thing for me to do?’ or ‘what is the right way 
for me to live?’ while political theories answer the question ‘what is the right thing for us to 
do?’ or ‘what is the right way for our shared life to be organised?’  
Care ethics eschews this distinction. Building on the feminist insight that ‘the personal 
is political’, care ethicists tend to believe experiences in our individual ethical lives must 
inform the principles that guide our political institutions, and that the nature of our political 
institutions condition possibilities within our individual ethical lives.
ii
  Care is both an ethical 
and a political value. One only needs to consider the titles of key books within care ethics to 
see this. Consider Joan Tronto’s Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of 
Care, or Eva Feder Kittay’s Love’s Labor: Essays in Women, Equality, and Dependency, or 
Nel Noddings’ Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy. Part II of this book will similarly 
run the gamut of individual and institutional life, by explaining exactly how and when it is 
possible for (what I will argue is) the core slogan of care ethics to generate responsibilities for 
institutions. To keep the terminology straightforward -- though at the risk of departing from 
the standard meanings of the terms -- I will use ‘moral theory’ or ‘moral philosophy’ to 
include normative theories of both ethics and politics. 
Another important initial clarification concerns care ethics’ relation to feminism. As 
stated earlier, this book will argue that care ethics’ conceptual core is the view that 
dependency relationships generate responsibilities (I will say much more about what these 
relationships are in Part II). Care ethics, we might say, is therefore a relational ethics. It 
claims that obligations derive from relations between persons. Not all ethical or political 
theories that are used to further feminist ends are relational. Much liberal feminism is 
characterised by the concepts of individual autonomy and individual rights (Baehr 2004). 
These feminists choose not to focus on relationships (especially dependency relationships), 
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the value of giving and receiving care, and the role that caregiving inevitably plays in all 
societies. It would therefore be incorrect to say that all feminist moral theorists do or should 
embrace care ethics, or that most care ethicists endorse all feminist moral theories. To 
describe care ethics as the feminist moral theory is to present only one understanding of the 
theory behind feminism, and to present only one understanding of the proper political and 
social uses of care ethics. (See similarly Pettersen 2008, ch. 2.) Not all feminist moral 
theories are relational, and relational moral theories -- including care ethics -- can 
legitimately be used for non-feminist purposes. (I say ‘non-feminist’ rather than ‘anti-
feminist’: it is difficult to imagine a relational moral theory that had upshots that were 
opposed to, rather than simply different from, the ends of feminism(s).) 
Yet it cannot be ignored that care ethics arose as a theory that speaks to moral life as 
experienced by women, and particularly as experienced in the ‘private sphere’ of the home 
and family. Indeed, the paradigm examples of what, in Part II, I will call ‘dependency 
relationships’ are relationships in which the vulnerable party is a young, elderly, or infirm 
person. As many care ethicists note, these are all dependents that have traditionally been 
cared for by unpaid women -- and when that work has been paid, it has been done mainly by 
poorly paid women of colour. For that reason, care ethics was early on conceived of as a 
women’s morality; giving voice to women’s experiences. (Though see Tronto (1993, Part II) 
for an early rebuttal of this conception.) 
This connection between care ethics and feminism is a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, by drawing ‘private sphere’ care responsibilities into moral philosophical debates 
and by demonstrating the centrality of dependence to all human lives, care ethics has drawn 
attention to the burdens that care responsibilities have traditionally placed on women. It has 
thus helped to advance some feminist goals. On the other hand, feminists have argued that 
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care ethics entrenches women’s subordinated caregiver role, since it suggests that such roles 
are necessary for the achievement of morally good ends. By valorising practices of caring for 
dependents, the thought goes, we implicitly endorse unjust power structures between care 
workers and others in society. (Hoagland 1991; Calhoun 1988; Bartky 1990; Card 1990) 
There is truth in the latter edge of the sword. Care ethics’ valorisation of care -- and 
the gendered and racialised power dynamics that often accompany it -- is an important 
criticism of the theory. Partly in response to this criticism -- and partly because I, like many 
care ethicists, do not view the theory’s insights as restricted to ‘traditional’ carers such as 
mothers (Tronto 1987; Tronto 1993, esp. ch. 3; Romain 1992) -- my aim in this book is to 
view care ethics as a theory that applies not only to ‘care work’ and ‘caregivers’ as those 
terms are used in social policy. Rather, I want care ethics to be recognised as a moral theory 
that applies to everyone, all of the time. Care ethics’ intersectional and feminist influences 
and upshots are important, and will be discussed where appropriate. But by describing care 
ethics as a universal moral theory -- a moral theory which generates responsibilities for all -- 
my hope is that those who are the usual ‘caregivers’ are seen as doing what we all already 
should be doing, rather than as doing what only they should be doing. 
Some will worry about this universalising approach. Virginia Held, for example, 
states that 
 
to include nonfeminist versions of valuing care among the moral approaches called 
the ethics of care is to unduly disregard the history of how this ethics has developed. 
… The history of the development of the contemporary ethics of care is the history of 
recent feminist progress. (Held 2006, 22) 
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Undoubtedly, care ethics’ development constitutes part of the progress of some feminist 
ideas. These ideas include the (undermining of the) distinction between private and public; 
the unavoidability of dependency relationships; the connection between care, autonomy, and 
empowerment; the sometimes questionable value of personal relationships; and the negative 
correlation between performing care work and enjoying political and economic power. But 
the interaction between care ethics and feminism is not straightforwardly mutually 
reinforcing. My project is not to deny or ignore care ethics’ special concern with feminists or 
feminists’ special concern with care ethics. Rather, I aim to show how these ideas -- whether 
properly called ‘feminist’ or not -- can be incorporated into a moral philosophy that is broad 
in scope, and properly applicable to all moral agents. 
 Others will worry that a full defence of care ethics cannot be achieved until we have 
considered how it plays in out in practice (Clement 1995, 45–6 expresses something like this 
worry). Perhaps this would require examining specific ethical and political issues -- wealth 
redistribution, say, or reproductive rights -- and assessing the verdicts that care ethics gives us 
on these. If these verdicts are inimical to women’s emancipation, or are otherwise 
unsatisfactory, then care ethics is a poor moral theory. This may be correct. With that in 
mind, my aim in this book is not to give a complete and bulletproof defence of care ethics. 
My aim is instead to establish what care ethics is as a moral theory and to show that it is at 
least a prima facie compelling theory. Having achieved this, the next task -- a big one that I 
do not attempt here -- would be to assess its real-world upshots for specific agents and 
systems. (That said, I believe my proposal will contain the resources to deal appropriately 
with practical issues, including feminist ones.) 
 Finally, it is worth saying something about care ethics’ history. As has been implied, I 
am interested in the care ethical cluster of concerns as they have been expressed by those who 
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self-identify as care ethicists (or who self-identify as writing about care ethics) over the last 
thirty years. The beginning of this period is marked by the 1982 release of Gilligan’s data on 
moral reasoning, mentioned above. But the origins of care ethics arguably go back further 
than this. Wendy Rogers (2004) points out that we find endorsement of ‘feminine’ ideals of 
emotionality and altruism in the late nineteenth century thinkers Marietta Kies and Lucia 
Ames Mead, who were themselves influenced by GWF Hegel and Immanuel Kant 
respectively. Sarah Clarke Miller (2012) further develops the connections between care ethics 
and Kant. Joan Tronto (1993, ch. 2) finds the origins of her version of care ethics in the moral 
theories of David Hume (see also Noddings 2010, ch. 6), Frances Hutcheson, and Adam 
Smith. Groenhout (2004, ch. 2) sees continuities between care ethicists’ conception of human 
nature and that of Augustine. And Howard Curzer (2007) finds praise of caregiving in the 
writings of Aristotle, whom Tronto also follows in some places (1993, 9, 145; 2013, 21). 
That we can trace care ethical themes in the history of moral philosophy should not be 
too surprising:  Hegel is famous for his emphasis on human intersubjectivity (as illustrated by 
the master-slave dialectic); Kant is famous for his account of the duty of beneficence; Hume 
is famous for seeing reason as the slave of the passions; Aristotle is famous for his idea of 
man as a social animal; and so on. These views all buttress, in some way or other, the general 
claims of care ethics as described in the previous section. But such historical sources -- while 
potentially rich and rewarding -- are not the focus of this book. The aptness for care ethics of 
such historical figures is something that one would have to argue for rather than assume. My 
intention is to sidestep such arguments, and focus instead on what unites self-identifying care 
ethics scholarship. Until there is a consensus on the role of different historical figures within 
that scholarship, it would be presumptuous to include them as part of the care ethics canon. 
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1.3 Chapter Overview 
The book’s argument will proceed as follows. Part I aims to develop a statement of the four 
key normative claims of care ethicists. To this end, chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 will each develop 
one of these four key claims. Each of these four chapters will engage in an critical 
examination of the existing care ethics literature, in order to explain how one of the four key 
claims is both (a) a reasonable reconstruction of that literature and (b) plausible on its own 
terms. By the end of Part I, we will have arrived at the following four key claims of care 
ethics:  
 
Claim 1. Ethical theory should positively endorse deliberation involving sympathy 
and direct attendance to concrete particulars. 
Claim 2. To the extent that they have value to individuals in the relationship, 
relationships ought to be (a) treated as moral paradigms, (b) valued, preserved, or 
promoted (as appropriate to the circumstance at hand) and (c) acknowledged as giving 
rise to weighty duties. 
Claim 3. Care ethics sometimes calls for agents to have caring attitudes, that is, 
attitudes that: (i) have as their object something that has interests, or something that 
might affect something that has interests; and that (ii) are a positive response (e.g. 
promoting, respecting, revering) to those interests; and that (iii) lead the agent’s 
affects, desires, decisions, attention, or so on to be influenced by how the agent 
believes things are going with the interest-bearer. 
Claim 4. Care ethics calls for agents to perform actions (i) that are performed under 
the (perhaps tacit) intention of fulfilling (or going some way to fulfilling) interest/s 
that the agent perceives some moral person (the recipient) to have; (ii) where the 
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strength of the demand is a complex function of the value of the intention, the 
likelihood that the action will fulfil the interest, and the extent to which the interest is 
appropriately described as a ‘need.’ 
 
Each of these four claims constitutes a distinctive feature of care ethics. They are also claims 
that (in some form or other) are rife in the care ethics literature. I hope that my phrasing of 
the four key claims will ring true to those familiar with care ethics, and will be informative to 
those new to it. Thus, the first part of the book is intended to be somewhat more descriptive 
and expository than the second part. For this reason, readers who are interested purely in a 
survey of the care ethics literature may choose to read Part I only. 
Although my aim in Part I is partly descriptive, I have no doubt that some care 
ethicists will think that the claims should be divided differently, or specified differently, or 
that different claims should have been included. For this reason, Part I is not wholly 
descriptive. As Part I assesses various arguments and disentangles various positions, some 
positions held by care ethicists will be rejected, and some potential care ethical claims will be 
left by the wayside. I argue that these four claims constitute the most defensible set of 
propositions that can be naturally derived from the existing care ethical literature -- not that 
they constitute the only possible reconstruction of that literature. The four claims should be 
plausible, independently of who has or has not expounded them.  
I should emphasise that Part I deals with normative claims, not descriptive ones. This 
is important, as care ethicists often make descriptive claims. For example, they note that 
‘traditional’ ethical theory has problematically ignored the care work typically done by 
women in most societies; that humans are deeply relational creatures; that humans’ resources 
for care are limited; and that humans’ embodiment makes them extremely fragile for much of 
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their lives. (E.g., Kittay 1999; Groenhout 2004, 24–40; Sevenhuijsen 1998, 28; Tronto 2013, 
28-9) Obviously, care ethicists view these empirical facts as lending support to certain 
normative claims. (At the extreme, we have Noddings (2010), who seeks an evolutionary 
basis for the caring impulse and, from there, the imperative to care. More moderately, we 
have Groenhout (2004), who argues that our ideas of what humans are is not entirely 
separable from our ideas of what they should be.) And as I contemplate the normative claims 
in Part I, I will have recourse to assessing some of these empirical claims’ ability to justify 
the normative claims. But my concern will be with the prescriptive conclusions of care ethics, 
not its descriptive premises. By and large, I will take care ethicists’ descriptive claims -- 
particularly those about the inevitable and extreme vulnerability of all human beings -- to be 
self-evident. 
At the end of Part I, we will be left with a collection of four key care ethical claims 
that is fragmented and still indeterminate. Part II’s task will be to unify and specify -- as well 
as explain -- the loosely related and somewhat vague claims that Part I has produced. In order 
to do that, it will first be necessary to introduce some heavy theoretical machinery: the 
dependency principle, and its application to groups. The dependency principle is care ethics’ 
core slogan -- or so I will go on to argue. Chapter 6 develops the dependency principle. In its 
brief version, this principle can be understood as asserting that a moral agent, A, has a 
responsibility when three conditions are met: (1) moral person B has an important interest 
that is unfulfilled; (2) A is sufficiently capable of fulfilling that interest; and (3) A’s most 
efficacious measure for fulfilling the interest will be not too costly. A incurs an even more 
weighty responsibility if (1) to (3) are true and (4) is also true: (4) A’s most efficacious 
measure for fulfilling the interest will be the least costly of anyone’s most efficacious 
measure for fulfilling B’s interest. Chapter 7 explains how this principle can produce 
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responsibilities for groups, from small-scale informal groups to nation-states. This will be 
important for making sense of care ethics’ application to politics (as seen in, e.g., 
Sevenhuijsen 1998; Engster 2007; Tronto 1993; Tronto 2013). 
Having developed this machinery independently of care ethics, Chapter 8 returns to 
care ethics. It uses the machinery of Chapters 6 and 7 to re-examine the four key claims that 
were developed in Part I. I explain how the dependency principle unifies, specifies, and 
justifies these four claims. Specifically, I address three questions about each of Part I’s four 
claims. First, does the dependency principle give us some responsibilities of the kind alluded 
to in the claim? Second, by care ethical lights, does the dependency principle give us enough 
responsibilities of the kind alluded to in the claim? And third, by care ethical lights, does the 
dependency principle give us the right explanation of the responsibilities alluded to in the 
claim?  
I expect the latter part of the book to be most contentious among those familiar with care 
ethics. If I am correct that the dependency principle is the best way to unify, specify, and 
justify care ethics’ key claims, then we will find that care ethics suggests the truth of a few 
claims that have not yet been examined by those writing on the theory. The acceptance of the 
dependency principle as the theoretical heart of care ethics will thus require adding some new 
claims to the periphery of the theory -- as well as rejecting some peripheral claims that are 
sometimes associated it. It will require tidying up the periphery of the theory. But the 
theory’s core will, I suggest, be all the stronger, clearer, and distinctive for this. 
                                                 
i
 My reading here accords with (at least) the views of Engster (2007, 61–2), Held (2004, 65, 
68), and Tronto (1993, 126); though Clement (1996, 1) claims the ethics of ‘care’ and 
‘justice’ are ‘more fundamental than other possible ethics because they thematize ... basic 
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dimensions of human relationships.’ I’m sceptical that other theories can’t be said to be doing 
the same. 
ii
 See Okin (1991, ch. 6) for one statement of the many ways in which the personal is 
political; though see Sevenhuijsen (1998, 73-80) for a criticism of Okin’s use of gender 
binaries and her relegation of care. See Clement (1996, ch. 4) for a care ethical dismantling of 
the public/private divide, and Tronto (1993, esp. 6-11) for discussion of shifting the 
boundaries between moral and political, and private and public. 
